Resurgent Russia? A Still-Faltering Military
By Zoltan Barany
In the past few years Moscow’s increasingly assertive foreign policy posture has been underscored by signs of improvement in the military realm. Several pundits have argued that the Russian army is “back,” that it is once again an effective force, having endured humiliating conditions through much of the post-Soviet period. Some recent developments have undoubtedly supported this contention. After all, in 2007 alone Russia resumed regular long-range bomber missions after a 16-year hiatus, conducted a military exercise with the People’s Republic of China and other members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (a.k.a. “The Dictators’ Club”) that included 6,500 troops and over 100 aircraft, increased defense spending by more than 30 percent, announced a new rearmament program, and began planning the reclamation of the old Soviet naval base at Tartus, Syria in order to reestablish a Mediterranean naval presence.
These events are in concert with the longstanding Soviet-Russian tradition of emphasizing the armed forces as the state ’s most important foreign policy instrument while designating lesser roles to diplomatic, economic, and other means. Still, those familiar with the magnitude of the Russian defense establishment ’s post-Cold War privations cannot but wonder whether it could have recovered quite so quickly. To be sure, the military ’s situation has improved in some respects in the past several years. At the same time, reversing the army ’s decline and regaining its former might will take many years, and the Russian armed forces will not be able to challenge America ’s military supremacy for decades. Indeed, my main argument here is that reports of the Russian army ’s imminent resurgence, like those of Mark Twain’s death nearly a century ago, have been greatly exaggerated.
I will focus on three closely related aspects of Russian defense policy — reform, manpower, and expenditures — under Vladimir Putin’s reign to show that the U.S. and the West have no cause for alarm in the foreseeable future. Before proceeding further, it ought to be acknowledged that reality remains often at odds with the propaganda emanating from the Kremlin. “Soviet statistics” was an oxymoron, as “hard data” originating from the ussr were notoriously unreliable. Though matters have improved somewhat since then, Russian figures, particularly on defense and security issues, should still be treated with caution. A recent example should suffice. In a January 11, 2006 Wall Street Journal article then-Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov boasted that in the armed forces “the number and level of large-scale exercises ha[d] grown to more than fifty” in 2005. In fact, only 31 of these were held at the regimental level and just one involved an entire division, even though the Russian military contains more than 20 divisions and hundreds of regiments.1 The point is that, given the authorities’ full control of television — the news source for most Russians — and their expanding grip on radio and print media, the information for domestic public consumption, let alone that intended for foreign audiences, is routinely manipulated and distorted.
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Not a credible threat — yet
The russian military at present is far more frightening on paper than in reality, but even on paper it is not a force that could pose a credible threat to the U.S and its nato allies in the foreseeable future. As was widely noted, a significant shortcoming of Putin ’s first term was the failure to carry out his pledge to comprehensively rebuild the Russian armed forces. Nearing the end of his second term and the 16-year mark after the Soviet collapse, the radical reform the military needs has not been implemented.
Nevertheless, the period of deterioration and stagnation seems to have ended and the recovery has begun. Even if all the new defense minister achieves is curbing corruption and rooting out hazing, he will have surpassed his predecessor ’s lackluster record in transforming the military and will have increased both societal support for and the prestige of the armed forces.
In the meantime, Western supporters of nato expansion may congratulate themselves for prevailing in the face of opponents’ arguments throughout the past decade that Russia was unable and disinclined to threaten the countries on its western borders. Thanks to the recent rounds of the Atlantic Alliance ’s expansion, the nations suppressed by the Soviet Union for half a century no longer need to face an aggressive Russia on their own. Little wonder that they are the most enthusiastic American allies in Europe.
As for the United States, it is time to focus on Russian deeds rather than words. Notwithstanding its frequent declarations of cooperation and partnership, the Kremlin’s actions show that it has, for quite some time now, viewed Russian-American relations as a zero-sum game: Whatever is bad for the U.S. must be good for Russia. There are many examples. A rift develops between the United States and some of its nato allies following the 2003 invasion of Iraq? Moscow steps into the fray to forge new ties with France and Germany. The U.S. — and the West — strongly objects to Iran’s nuclear program? Russia insists on continuing to supply Iran, even though an unstable nuclear power on Russia ’s border might not be the wisest policy. Hamas — an organization that openly repudiates Israel’s right to exist and with whose leaders the U.S. refuses to bargain — wins the Palestinian elections? Russia is quick to hold talks with its leaders in Moscow. Venezuela ’s virulently anti-American president, Hugo Chávez, wants to re-arm to “deter or repel any invasion by U.S. forces”? Russia is happy to oblige with a sale of 100,000 Kalashnikov rifles, a new Kalashnikov factory, and 24 Sukhoi-30 fighter jets. Calling Putin “our friend” does not alter the fact that Moscow considers Washington its primary potential enemy.
Still, despite the recent infusions of resources, Russia’s army remains a pale shadow of its former self. If it is, indeed, on the road to recovery, it has a very long way to go considering its present condition, confusion about its future direction, and the enormous advances the U.S. armed forces have made since the Cold War.
Pertinent Links:
1) Resurgent Russia? A Still-Faltering Military
Showing posts with label Zoltan Barany. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Zoltan Barany. Show all posts
Tuesday, February 5, 2008
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