By Abbas J. Ali
Just before the invasion of Iraq, President George W. Bush and Prime Minster Tony Blair appeared confident that once Saddam Hussein was deposed, most of the Middle East problems would dissipate. Both leaders made a powerful argument that the invasion of Iraq would facilitate profound change especially in democratizing the region and in solving its protracted Palestinian-Israeli question. Sadly, the outcome has been tragic for Iraqis and the region has experienced the worse calamity in recent history.
Indeed, the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq has been a disappointment, especially for the people there. The region is on a verge of total chaos and suddenly it has been infected with social diseases that, until recently, have been alien to the majority of the people. In the midst of newly unfolding events, Middle East and international affairs experts have been puzzled by the dramatic down turn and many have hopelessly attempted to map what the future holds for the strategically vital region. One of the most frightening scenarios is the “potential” civil war that is looming between the two major Muslim communities, Sunni and Shia. These communities have generally lived in harmony with each other for centuries.
In particular, throughout history, Iraq has experienced minor forms of sectarian tension (e.g. in the eleventh and twelve centuries demonstrations or heated religious debates took place). But it has never reached the magnitude and scale which has evolved since the invasion. For many decades, sectarianism was almost an alien concept for the majority of Iraqis. Following the invasion, sectarian terminologies have become conspicuously common in daily political discourse. Unfamiliar with Iraqi history and culture, senior officers of the occupational authority and the invasion forces have frequently issued sectarian statements, in a society that was mostly sectarian adverse. Worse, these statements have been perceived as an invitation to stimulate Shia-Sunni tension. Alienated and insecure, Iraqis have gradually fallen victim to sectarianism and some have started to espouse sectarian identity.
The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in July 2006 and its fierce fighting with the Lebanese resistant movement, where Lebanese Shia constituted the majority, has further helped to infuse Shia-Sunni terminology into the Bush administration regular political discourse. Since President Bush and Secretary of State Rice have treated the Lebanese crisis, not as a political problem, but as a security challenge to their design for the Middle East, media outlets in the U.S. and the rest of the World have incorporated Shia –Sunni terminologies in their daily reporting without even a vague understanding of the terms and their historical or political underpinnings.
Western media, however, is not alone in misunderstanding and misusing Shia-Sunni terminologies. Arab and Muslim reporters, across the world, have found the sectarian subject alluring and have shown a conspicuous interest in perpetuating certain myths. These myths have poisoned the minds of unsophisticated individuals and deepened misunderstandings and social tensions. Arab governments and dictators, in particular, have seized on this opportunity and capitalized on the Shia-Sunni spilt to divert the attention of their own public from pressing issues pertaining to power abuse, lack of democracy, wide-spread corruption, economic and social inequality, and chronic economic crises. This destructive diversion appears to be working and the Middle East has become more than ever a boiling volcano.
Those who are intimately familiar with Islamic thinking and historical Arab politics argue that the Shia-Sunni split should be understood as a sociopolitical development that is associated with the early formation of the city state in Arabia before and immediately after the arise of Islam. In fact, those who objectively trace the evolution of the Shia-Sunni spilt point out two fascinating aspects that often stand out. These do not revolve around how a clannish struggle for power and influence evolved gradually and persistently into political aspirations expressed in religious beliefs. Rather, these two aspects are linked to the fact that unchallenged myths often emerge as powerful force and, accordingly, are often treated as reality. The first aspect is the blind acceptance of certain myths by intellectuals, including reporters, both in the West and in Muslim dominated countries, and how they subsequently have failed to formulate a reasonable knowledge-driven outlook to comprehend this historical development. The second aspect is the never-ending utility, for politicians, of employing this spilt as a means to optimally serve their political aspirations and consolidation of power. In this regard, an attempt is made in this paper to briefly deconstruct the most widely held myths.
These myths are outlined below:
1. Schism in Islam between Shia and Sunni began immediately after the death
of the Prophet Muhammad around 632 as Muslims were divided into two groups;
those who supported Abu Bakr as the first successor (Caliph) of the Prophet
Mohamed and those who believed that Mohamed’s son-in-law and immediate cousin,
Ali, should be the Caliph.
2. There was a bloody civil war between the two communities immediately
after Abu Bakr became the caliph.
3. The sectarian spilt and conflict between the two Muslim communities
intensified after bin Umayyad came to power as Maawiya Ibn Abu Sufyan became
Caliph in 661.
4. Unlike the Shia, the Sunni communities uniformly condone all caliphs.
The article begins by framing the evolution of the Shia – Sunni spilt into five general stages. These stages briefly capture the most significant factors including tribal, political, and religious which have shaped the nature of the division in Islam and ultimately changed the course of action in Islamic polity. The outline offers a better understanding of the progression of the spilt across centuries. More importantly, the presentation, at each stage and collectively, helps to deconstruct the preceding myths without underestimating the historical value attached to the emergence of the division or compromising the integrity of its key actors.
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Read the whole thing...You will probably know more about Sunni-Shi'i differences after reading this than the majority of our leadership in Washington D.C....
Pertinent Links:
1) Schism in Islam: Myths and Continuing Misconceptions Regarding the Sunni-Shi'i Split
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