MUST READ: A REPORT FROM THE FIELD: GAUGING THE IMPACT OF TALIBAN SUICIDE BOMBING

A Report from the Field: Gauging the Impact of Taliban Suicide Bombing
By Brian Glyn Williams

The following study is based on field research carried out in the summers of 2003, 2005 and the spring of 2007 in 15 Afghan provinces including: Paktia, Nangarhar (Jalalabad), Panjshir, Balkh (Mazar-i-Sharif), Takhar, Bamiyan, Kabul and Herat. Specific assistance was granted by the United Nations, the U.S. military, Hekmat Karzai’s Center for Afghan Peace Studies as well as numerous NGO members and average Afghans who chose to remain anonymous.

In the aftermath of the toppling of the Taliban, Kabul, which has tremendous significance as a symbol of authority for those who aspire to rule Afghanistan, was the primary target of the Taliban's suicide bombing campaign. The initial sporadic attacks—which included an attack on a German International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) convoy and foreigners in an antique-selling street known as "Chicken Street" that is popular with Afghanistan's rare "tourists"—rattled foreigners living in Afghanistan and presaged things to come. The United Nations, for example, subsequently forbade its workers from visiting Chicken Street. ISAF and U.S. convoys appeared to be on edge as they moved through the streets as early as 2003, long before the real suicide bombing campaign began. The initial wave of bombings from 2002-2005 was the Taliban's way of "throwing down the gauntlet" and demonstrating that the Hamid Karzai government could not uphold its promise of security to the people in the capital.

Nevertheless, for most Kabulis who have a much higher threshold for violence than Westerners who have not lived through two-and-a-half decades of war, life went on. Kabul's population skyrocketed; restaurants and modern steel and glass buildings sprang up; "Roshan" cell phones began to appear in the hands of young women who wore head scarves instead of burqas; traffic jams materialized; and Kabulis threw themselves into taking advantage of the new climate of security to rebuild their lives. Between 2003 and 2005, Afghans, including General Rashid Dostum who was the target of one such bombing, unanimously dismissed the suicide bombings as being the work of "die hards," "foreigners," "Arabs" and, most importantly, "Pakistanis". Many claimed that the Afghan Taliban, for all its faults, would not engage in suicide attacks and President Karzai himself proclaimed that the "Sons of Afghanistan" would never carry out such "un-Islamic" actions.

Today, however, there is a perceptible shift in opinion in Kabul that stems from the fact that Kabul has been the target of more than two dozen suicide attacks since 2005. Nevertheless, progress in the capital, which in and of itself is a bubble removed from the provinces, especially those in the south, has continued apace despite the fact that these random attacks are clearly beginning to take their toll. Among the many stoic Kabulis, there is a palpable sense of fear and acceptance of the fact that fellow Afghans are increasingly responsible for the carnage that takes its toll primarily on civilians. A driver in Kabul, for example, had the disconcerting habit of pointing out to his passenger the spots where suicide bombings had taken place in recent months. He seemed to be consumed by the fear of becoming a victim himself.

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Pertinent Links:

1) A Report from the Field: Gauging the Impact of Taliban Suicide Bombing