MUST READ: BECOMING AN AYATOLLAH: THE NEW IRAQI POLITICS OF MOQTADA AL-SADR

Becoming an Ayatollah: The New Iraqi Politics of Moqtada al-Sadr
By Babak Rahimi

As a political and military force, Iraq’s Shiite Sadrist movement has undergone a number of radical transformations since 2003, when its leader, Moqtada al-Sadr, surprisingly emerged as a leading political figure. Al-Sadr’s recent decision to continue with his seminary studies and graduate as an ayatollah at the conservative seminary school of Najaf underpins a major change in the movement’s structure that could have serious repercussions for the future of Iraq. Against the backdrop of changing political alliances between Kurds and Sunnis, al-Sadr is transforming his movement into a new political phenomenon with implications for the country’s political structure and security dynamics. The consequences are also immense for Shiite Iraq, posing serious challenges to the conservative clerical establishment in Najaf.

Al-Sadr’s attempt to become an ayatollah follows his earlier call to suspend operations by his militia, the Jaish al-Mahdi (The Mahdi Army, or JaM) in the summer of 2007. Together with his decision to study in Najaf, this has marked a decisive new beginning in the organizational structure and leadership dynamics of the Mahdi militia. The decision to suspend JaM was made largely because of the outbreak of violence between Mahdi forces and the rival Badr Organization in Karbala in August 2007 (Aftab-e Yazd [Iran], August 30, 2007). The incident was a major embarrassment for al-Sadr, who had been seeking the support of Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Shiite Iraq’s grand cleric, and the conservative establishment in Tehran against the rebellious splinter groups within his own militia since 2005. The suspension, which came in August 2007, was a way to ensure his Shiite partners that he was willing to restructure his forces for the sake of Shiite unity at a time when US—or Israeli—forces seemed to be on the brink of starting a major military conflict with Iran.

The call was welcomed by al-Sistani, who had been encouraging al-Sadr to arrive at such a decision since January 2007 (author’s interview with a representative of Ayatollah al-Sistani, Qom, August 29, 2007). The two met in June to discuss the problem of JaM splinter groups (Aftab-e Yazd, June 14, 2007).

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The New JaM(s)?

Although it remains to be seen whether JaM will re-emerge as a more disciplined militia under the full control of al-Sadr, February 2008 will most likely witness the rise of a new JaM with a better trained military corps, a centralized command apparatus and tightly watched areas of operation. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards—or perhaps Lebanese Hezbollah—may play a more direct role in the organizational restructuring process, though much of this may depend on the future of U.S.-Iranian relations. With Hezbollah of Lebanon serving as a model for the new JaM, the result could be an impressive, newly equipped and armed military force, unlike its origin as a populist militia with limited abilities (Shahrvand-e Emrooz, December 30, 2007).

But this new development contains the danger of upsetting many Sadrists who may feel left out from the reorganized militia, inflating the number of existing splinter groups. Those members of al-Sadr’s militia who are desperately seeking new leadership from a charismatic leader who can bravely uphold the movement’s nationalist and anti-establishment ideology have the greatest risk of splitting from the existing militia. The new JaM unveiled this month may give way to an upsurge of new Sadrist movements, all claiming to represent the authentic ideals of al-Sadr’s father-in-law, though all differing in the ways in which they operate in the militia-ridden landscape of Shiite Iraq.

All in all, al-Sadr’s choice of strategy is significant. It signals a new era of Iraqi politics that will likely revolve around control over resources—i.e., oil—and territorial domination—i.e., militia power—rather than identity politics of the ethnic and sectarian sort witnessed in the earlier years of the post-war period. Although the decline of sectarianism is certainly good for Iraq, the rise of a new factional struggle for control over resources may only breed new forms of militia politics. The appearance of the new JaM may serve as a sign of an ominous future.


Pertinent Links:

1) Becoming an Ayatollah: The New Iraqi Politics of Moqtada al-Sadr (PDF LINK)